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Abstract
Employees di⁄er both in terms of general human capital and ￿rm-speci￿c hu-
man capital (or match with a particular ￿rm). Current employers typically have
access to more information about their employees than rival employers. This in-
formation asymmetry a⁄ects the distribution of wages, turnover rates, pro￿ts, and
the extent of allocative ine¢ ciency in the labour market. We begin by exploring
the implications of di⁄erent information structures and highlight that information
a⁄ects both the extent and distribution of adverse selection. We then suppose that
￿rms can a⁄ect the information that they or their rivals observe, thereby endoge-
nizing the extent and nature of asymmetric information between current and rival
employers. In particular, we highlight that di⁄erent information structures that
lead to similar adverse selection can di⁄er in their allocative e¢ ciency. Using this
observation, we detail how optimal information management policies vary across
￿rms with di⁄erent human capital management priorities, and how these decisions
a⁄ect aggregate labour market outcomes.
Keywords: human capital, information disclosure, regression to the mean,
adverse selection, turnover, wage distribution, human resource management.
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21 Introduction
Two central and established themes in labour theory are adverse selection and the distinc-
tion between ￿rm-speci￿c and general human capital. However, typically, these themes
have been considered separately. This paper begins by introducing match-speci￿c value
in a standard model of adverse selection, building on a large literature initiated by Wald-
man (1984) and Greenwald (1986). Speci￿cally, rival employers observe some statistic
about a worker￿ s productivity and make wage o⁄ers. Having observed these o⁄ers, the
current employer decides whether to retain the worker (matching the highest outside
o⁄er) or to release her.
Allowing for ￿rm-speci￿c matches introduces a regression to the mean e⁄ect in the
model. This arises because the current employer￿ s best estimates￿ based on her pri-
vate information￿ of a worker￿ s productivity if retained within the ￿rm (retained human
capital) and if released to join another ￿rm (general human capital) are not perfectly
correlated: sometimes workers will be expected to be more productive if retained and
sometimes more productive if released. In this context, regression to the mean implies
that workers with high retained productivity are likely to have lower productivity else-
where, conversely workers with low retained productivity in their ￿rst employment are
expected to have higher productivity elsewhere. This provides a reason for some workers
to switch jobs purely on the grounds of e¢ ciency. A contribution of the paper is to
explore how this ￿ legitimate￿reason for job turnover interacts with the other fundamen-
tal force, adverse selection, under di⁄erent information structures (that is, assumptions
about the information held by current and rival employers).
In characterising the e⁄ect of an information structure, it is useful to focus on
the extent of adverse selection that arises when outside employers draw inferences from
the current employer￿ s retention decision. When outside ￿rms have information that
eliminates the need to make this inference there is no adverse selection. For example, this
will be the case is outside employers have the same information as the current employer
about a worker￿ s outside productivity (or general human capital). Equally, if the outside
employers have the same estimate as the current employer of inside productivity, then
public information is ￿ner than that contained in the retention decision, so once again
there is no adverse selection. Note, however, that while these two information structures
or regimes induce the same adverse selection (and hence the same expected wage), they
di⁄er in their e¢ ciency in allocating labour.
More generally, in assessing di⁄erent information structures, we de￿ne the quantity
of adverse selection at each realisation of the statistic observed by outside ￿rms as the
3di⁄erence between the wage if there were no private information and its equilibrium value.
In Section 3.3, in our joint normal speci￿cation of the model, we show that information
structures consisting of a garbled report of the current employer￿ s best estimate of outside
productivity (i.e. general human capital plus random noise) generate an amount of
adverse selection that is independent of the realisation. However, we identify other
information structures for which adverse selection is imposed more heavily on those
workers whom it is e¢ cient for the ￿rm to retain.1 Our goal is to analyze the impact of
di⁄erent information structures on average wages, ￿rm pro￿ts and retention decisions.
For application, it is important to consider how di⁄erent information structures
might arise. First, it is natural that the nature of production, or the industry might
lead to exogenously di⁄erent information structures. Trivial, but illustrative examples,
include that the information available to potential employers about sportsmen, actors,
and musicians is quite di⁄erent to the information on private investigators, or spies.
Similarly, the information about programmers that outsiders observe can di⁄er dramat-
ically depending on whether the project is open source or closed source (as discussed for
example in Lerner and Tirole (2005), Spiegel (2005), and in an approach perhaps closest
to this paper, Blatter and Niedermayer (2008)).
Further, varied information structures might arise endogenously through ￿rms￿de-
cisions. Speci￿cally, we analyze ￿rms￿strategic choices when they commit to the infor-
mation available to potential rival employers. For example, ￿rms might credibly commit
(either contractually, or often through reputational concerns) as to how much time a
programmer can spend on open source, or the extent to which a consultant or lawyer
has direct access and contact with clients, publicize that the worker is indeed employed
at the ￿rm, for example, through a website, or even institute rules and restrictions on so-
cial interactions (Leibeskind, 1997). More broadly, choices over production technologies
(such as whether to require team or solo production) and the design of organization (in-
cluding layers of hierarchy and promotion criteria) will a⁄ect the information structure.
Here, we abstract from considering direct costs in such choices and, instead, treat the
￿rm as directly choosing the nature of the signal observed by rival potential employers.
Using our characterization of the e⁄ects of di⁄erent information structures, it is
relatively straightforward to characterize ￿rm￿ s preferred information policies. Our re-
sults here are driven by a simple trade-o⁄: policies that best enable ￿rms to exploit
talent (by capturing general human capital rents) make it hard to attract employees,
and vice versa. Equilibrium policies therefore re￿ ect the relative importance to the ￿rm
1In the language of auction theory, bidders observe a combination of common and private valuations,
rather than, e.g., a garbling of the common valuation.
4of attracting versus exploiting talent.
To explore these ideas, we extend the model by supposing that ￿rms compete to
hire workers in each of two periods. In the ￿rst stage, no ￿rm holds an informational
advantage. Firms can gain informational advantage through ￿rst period employment
and depending on initial contracts which consist not only of a wage o⁄er, but, also, a
disclosure policy (leading to a particular information structure). Having chosen a ￿rst
period employer, workers generate performance statistics which are privately observed by
their employer, as well as acquiring skills that are valuable in second period production.
The second period then proceeds exactly as above, outside ￿rms observe some statistic of
this information (arising from the disclosure policy to which the ￿rst period employer had
committed) and then make second period wage o⁄ers. Having observed these o⁄ers, ￿rst
period employers decide whether to retain their workers (matching the highest outside
o⁄er) or to release them. Workers then engage in second period production and the game
ends.
Note that in the ￿rst period competition between ￿rms, ￿rms attract workers both
directly, through ￿rst period wages, and indirectly, through the future careers (as ex-
pressed by the expected second period wages) that they o⁄er. These career prospects,
in turn, arise from the general skills and training that are o⁄ered in the ￿rm (which, for
the most part, we treat as exogenous) and from the disclosure policy chosen. Disclosure
policies, however, do not simply imply transfers of second period surplus between em-
ployees and ￿rst period employers, since di⁄erent disclosure policies vary in the extent
of surplus-destroying allocative distortion that they introduce. We can quantify this
explicitly using our characterization of information structures that associates with each
possible disclosure policy a pair of outcomes: expected future earnings for the worker
and expected future pro￿ts for the ￿rm.
Thus the disclosure policy for our ￿rms corresponds to the best choice from the
set of feasible wage, pro￿t pairs, bearing in mind that ￿rst period wages can transfer
future pro￿t to workers but, because of credit constraints, not necessarily future wages
to pro￿t. Firms facing competition to attract workers (competitive ￿rms) will seek to
maximise e¢ ciency (the sum of future earnings and future pro￿ts which are transferred
to the worker as current wages). In contrast, ￿ technologically advantaged￿￿rms face
limited competition and transform worker rent into pro￿ts via adverse selection (skill-
augmenting ￿rms).
These results have implications for labour market outcomes.2 In Section 5.2.1,
2Acemoglu (2002) stresses that technological changes are likely to alter the ways in which ￿rms
organise production and consequently impact on labour market outcomes. The current paper endorses
5we calculate how wage distributions and labour turnover rates respond, via informa-
tion management policies, to technological changes in the skill-augmenting sector. A
decline in either the mean of estimated general human capital formation or mean match
quality, or an increase in the variance of estimated match quality, increases the rate of
labour turnover in the skill-augmenting sector. Interestingly, since an increase in the
variance of an estimate can be interpreted as an improvement in information, this sug-
gests that observed increases in labour turnover could stem from improved information
acquisition within ￿ innovative￿￿rms. Turning to the distribution of wages, an increase
in the ￿skill-gap￿(the expected human capital di⁄erence between the skill-augmenting
and competitive ￿rms) increases inequality and skews the distribution of wage in the
skill-augmenting sector to the left, while an increase in the mean, or a reduction in
the variance, of estimated match quality increases inequality but has little impact on
skewness.
Related Literature As noted above, our analysis draws on the familiar concepts of
adverse selection and regression to the mean (the latter inducing match quality).3 These
concepts have been widely applied in the labour economics literature, although typically
separately. The notion of match quality, building on Becker￿ s distinction of speci￿c
human capital, was introduced by Jovanovic (1979) who shows that a non-degenerate
distribution of worker-￿rm match values leads to worker turnover as information about
match values accrues over time. In emphasising the dynamics of the learning process,
Jovanovic abstracts from general human capital and (hence) adverse selection aspects. In
contrast, Waldman (1984) and Greenwald (1986) focuses squarely on adverse selection,
highlighting that this force can lead workers to earn less than their marginal products and
has implications labour turnover.4 Indeed, in Greenwald￿ s model, there is no turnover
unless there is a possibility that separations occur for exogenous reasons. We show that
introducing a non-degenerate distribution of match quality into a model of general human
capital formation counterbalances the forces of adverse selection. Even when ￿rms hold
this view and details such a mechanism.
3Adverse selection can, of course, be traced back to Akerlof (1970). Regression to the mean predates
even Galton (1885) who ￿xed the idea in what Koenker (2001) calls ￿Arguably, the most important
statistical graphic ever produced.￿Galton￿ s graphic related child and parental height. Tall parents tend
to have tall children, though not so tall as themselves. Similarly for short parents. Of course, we are
concerned with productivity in ￿rst and subsequent employments rather than heights of parents and
children but the principal is the same.
4The fact that workers earn less than their marginal products gives rise to the possibility of ￿rm-
sponsored human capital investments. This idea is developed in many subsequent papers including
Katz and Ziderman (1990), Chang and Wang (1996) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998). Acemoglu and
Pischke (1999) provide a review that emphasises the role of exogenous market frictions.
6private information relating to general human capital (the Greenwald case), our model
endogenously generates positive labour turnover.
In this sense, our paper is related to Li (2006) who also seeks to explain job mobility
in the presence of asymmetric information over worker productivity. Li models the wage
determination process as a ￿rst price auction. This creates a bidding situation similar
to Milgrom and Weber￿ s (1981) analysis of the ￿ mineral rights￿model in which there
is a single informed bidder and a number of uninformed bidders. In this setting, the
uninformed bidders adopt a mixed strategy which generates positive turnover and a
non-degenerate distribution of wages. Though in Li￿ s setting there is no match-speci￿c
component of productivity and no e¢ ciency consequences of turnover. In our model,
wages are determined via a second price auction and turnover arises from the non-
degenerate distribution of match quality. Notably, this gives an e¢ ciency rationale
for turnover that is absent in Li (2006). A further di⁄erence is that Li assumes the
information structure to be exogenously ￿xed.
Eeckhout (2006) also studies a setting where current employers (exogenously) have
superior information to outsiders to examine implications for turnover and wages. In his
model there is gradual learning, as in Jovanovic (1979), but over general human capital
rather than match quality. This approach contrasts with our model where information
asymmetries are endogenous and there is persistence in match-speci￿c values (the latter
leads to our regression to the mean e⁄ect). A further di⁄erence arises in the wage-
determination process. In Eeckhout￿ s model wages are determined via a second price
auction with two heterogenous bidders￿ an incumbent and a challenger, each of whom
have private information (see, also, Pinkston 2008). In our model, wages are pinned
down by the behaviour of (interim) identical outside ￿rms. This ￿competitive fringe￿
assumption greatly simpli￿es the analysis.
Although we abstract from internal organisation costs of information management
in order to focus on the adverse selection vs e¢ ciency trade-o⁄ most directly, our paper
relates to a signi￿cant organisational economics literature in which internal organisation
costs play a major role. Waldman (1984) (and more recently DeVaro and Waldman
(2005)), Ricart-i-Costa (1988) and Blanes i Vidal (2007) argue that, since adverse se-
lection in the labor market can a⁄ect wages,5 retention rates and thereby pro￿ts, ￿rms
will have incentives to distort (respectively) promotion, task assignment or delegation
decisions. These are examples where organisational design is partly motivated by human
5Gibbons and Katz (1991) present empirical support for the economic signi￿cance of such e⁄ects.
More recently, Sch￿nberg (2007) ￿nds evidence of adverse selection for college graduates, while Hu and
Taber (2005) ￿nd a marked e⁄ect for white males. See also Kahn (2008). Finally, Pinkston (2008)
presents evidence and discusses gradual asymmetric learning between di⁄erent potential employers.
7capital management issues and, furthermore, impacts through information ￿ ows to the
labour market.6
Finally, our paper is also closely related to a growing literature studying information
disclosure (see, e.g., Calzolari and Pavan (2006), Mukherjee (2008), Koch and Peyrache
(2005) and Albano and Leaver (2005)). Like the current paper, this literature highlights
that an employer￿ s information management policy can form part of overall compensation
as it in￿ uences an employee￿ s future career prospects.7 (See also Kim and Marschke
(2005) and Lewis and Yao (2006) who explore this idea in the context of researchers).
Though, many of these papers highlight career concern and moral hazard aspects omitted
in our analysis; our paper focuses on the detailed implications for wages and turnovers
of a broader range of information structures than is typically considered (for example,
Albano and Leaver (2005) consider only fully transparent and fully opaque structures).
Moreover, this paper in allowing for variation in both general human capital and match
values, allows for consideration of e¢ cient turnover and for richer information structure
than many of these works which either force all workers to move ￿rms between the
￿rst and second period (Koch and Peyrache, 2005) and Calzolari and Pavan, 2006) or
assume that the worker is always more productive in the outside ￿rm by a ￿xed amount
(Mukherjee, 2008).
2 A Model of Information Structures and Labour
Market Outcomes
Consider a current employer I who privately observes a vector-valued ￿ test statistic￿QI.
The vector QI should be thought of as everything the ￿rm knows about its worker. In
particular, information in QI will allow the current employer to estimate YII, the value of
a worker￿ s output when retained in ￿rm I, and YII0 the value of her output when released
to a di⁄erent ￿rm I0. It is convenient to think of the current employers information QI as
simply given by YI the vector of productivities. This notation is somewhat cumbersome,
but proves useful in the extension of the model in Section 4.
While the current employer, or inside ￿rm, observes QI, rival employers observe a
6Burguet, Caminal and Matutes (1999) take a di⁄erent path using similar ingredients. They argue
that in certain industries, speci￿cally professional sports, characterised by extreme visibility of perfor-
mance, incentives are created for restrictive labour practices￿ such as transfer fees.
7Calzolari and Pavan (2006) allow for general disclosure policies, and do not have a labour mar-
ket application speci￿cally in mind. They do not consider the possibility of retention and assume a
monopsonist employer in the second period, leading to somewhat di⁄erent e⁄ects and considerations.
8di⁄erent statistic TI = TI(QI). Note, we assume that inside ￿rms always have available
any relevant information that outside employers hold.8
Employment Wage Determination Outside ￿rms compete to hire the worker and
make ￿take it or lose it￿employment wage o⁄ers. The employer then either matches the
best o⁄er made to the worker or releases this worker to join one of the highest outside
bidders. Equivalently, there is an ascending open auction in which ￿rms bid up wages
until all but one ￿rm drops out of the bidding.
As noted above, an alternative that does deliver somewhat di⁄erent results is pro-
posed by Li (2006). Li￿ s ￿rst price auction model would appear to be appropriate in
cases where ￿nal wage o⁄ers can be made by either side of the market, but not credibly
communicated to the other side before the wage round must be concluded.
2.1 Simplifying Assumptions
In order to simplify the analysis of the employment wage determination process, we
impose the following assumption on the joint distribution of test statistics and produc-
tivities.
Assumption 1. For any pair of ￿rms I0 and I00; (QI;YII0) and (QI;YII00) have identical
distributions.
Outside ￿rms are interim identical: they all take the same view of the worker￿ s likely
output in their ￿rm (though the realizations in di⁄erent ￿rms may turn out to di⁄er).
Given this assumption, we can uniquely de￿ne
GI =
def
E[YII0jQI], I 6= I
0:
The random variable GI is the current employer￿ s best estimate of the worker￿ s value in
an outside employment (her general human capital). Since the current employer holds
all of the information relating to this worker in the economy, GI is also the quantity that
8Note that, for a given information structure, all the information required to determine wages and
retention decisions comprises the information held by rival employers TI and the inside ￿rm￿ s best
estimate of the worker￿ s productivity in the ￿rm RI = E[YIIjQI]. It follows, that while it is convenient
to assume that the ￿rm observes QI, there would be no loss in assuming that the ￿rm observes only
TI and RI. This lower information requirement for the incumbent ￿rm might be a more palatable
assumption and viewed as consistent with our maintained interpretation of the disclosed statistic TI as
arising through the ￿rm￿ s organizational design.





The random variable RI is the ￿rst period employer￿ s best estimate of the worker￿ s value
in the current, inside employment (her retained human capital).9
GI will generally di⁄er from RI. Experience QI = q may reveal that a worker
￿ts especially well with ￿rm I (E[YIIjQI = q] > E[YII0jQI = q]) or, equally, that there
has been a bad match. Di⁄erences between GI and RI will play an important role in
our analysis, with the statistical possibility of a bad match endogenously generating
labour turnover. It is natural to adopt a framework in which this matching manifests
itself through regression to the mean: workers who perform well (badly) in their initial
employment will tend to perform worse (better) if they switch jobs. This corresponds to
an assumption that the regression ￿ line￿E[GIjRI = x] has a slope (derivative) everywhere
between zero and one, implying, for instance, that Cov(GI;RI) ￿ 0 and Cov(RI ￿
GI;RI) ￿ 0: In fact, we will make a somewhat stronger assumption.
Assumption 2. For each ￿rm I, the pair of random variables (RI￿GI;GI) are a¢ liated
with density logconcave in each variable taken separately.
This assumption leads to the following convenient properties, as proven in the
Appendix.
Remark 1 Assumption 2 implies that, E[GIjRI = r], r￿E[GIjRI = r],and E[GIjRI ￿
GI = r] are all increasing in r. For any w 2 R; E[GIjRI ￿ w] ￿ E[GI] and E[GIjRI ￿
w] ￿ E[GI].
Regression to the mean introduces a ￿genuine reason for sale￿which counterbalances the
standard Akerlof lemons e⁄ect and tends to protect the market for experienced workers
from complete collapse. Given regression to the mean, in the absence of any further
information disclosure, an outside ￿rm need not conclude that any worker it can hire at
a given wage will generate a loss at that wage; rather, a released worker may simply have
been a bad match. A further implication of regression to the mean is that e¢ ciency in
the allocation of labour requires a positive turnover of workers; to maximise productivity,
a selection of workers should switch jobs.
9Our analysis allows QI to contain YII and YII0 but certainly does not rest on this assumption; all
that is required is that ￿rm I knows something about its worker￿ s likely inside and outside productivity
that other ￿rms might not.
103 Analysis
3.1 Wage Determination and De￿nitions
With Assumption 1 in hand, characterising wages is relatively straightforward. Since
outside employers are interim identical, employment wages will be set in Bertrand com-
petition, and hence equal the expected productivity of a worker in an outside ￿rm con-
ditional on the publicly available information. This information includes the event that
the worker is released by her current employer.10 The equilibrium employment wage
when a worker is employed by ￿rm I and TI = TI(QI) = t is realised is de￿ned implicitly
by
wTI(t) = E[GIjTI = t;RI ￿ wTI(t)], (1)
whenever such a wTI(t) exists.11 The notation wTI(t) denotes the wage payable under
disclosure policy TI = TI(QI) when TI = t is realised (we use TI to denote both the
disclosure policy and the random variable that it generates); wTI(TI) therefore denotes
the random wage which will be generated by the disclosure policy. We will write the
expected employment wage as
WTI = E[wTI(TI)]: (2)
The expected pro￿t, is equal to output less employment wages in the event that
the worker is retained (which occurs if the pro￿ts from doing so are positive), which we
write as
￿TI = E[(RI ￿ wTI(TI))
+], (3)
where (x)+ denotes x when positive, zero otherwise.
Next, we de￿ne the degree of adverse selection when TI = t is realised
ASTI(t) = E[GI j TI = t] ￿ E[GI j TI = t;RI ￿ wTI(t)]. (4)
The quantity ASTI(t) measures how much lower the employment wage is when outside
￿rms condition on the employer￿ s retention behaviour in addition to the realisation TI =
10The relevance of this event to employers bidding for GI (common values) and the possibility of a
winner￿ s curse is familiar from auction theory.
11At this level of generality, we cannot rule out (perverse) cases where the implicit function theorem
fails. In such cases, the equation does not de￿ne the function wTI; however, the condition is still required
to hold. Also, it is possible that there is no w such that w = E[GIjTI = t;RI ￿ w], in which case we
set wTI(t) = inf supp GI.
11t. Expected adverse selection equals the expected shortfall in employment wages from
outside productivity,
E[ASTI(TI)] = E[GI] ￿ WTI: (5)
Finally, it is convenient to introduce notation for the feasible set, ￿(￿I). This set is
the main object of our analysis and consists of the expected wage-pro￿t pairs (WTI;￿TI)
that can be achieved for a given set of disclosure policies, ￿I.
We proceed in two stages. First, in Section 3.2, we establish some benchmark results
under our general distributional assumptions for (GI;RI) but with a highly restricted
set of information structures. Speci￿cally, we focus on the case where ￿I = fGI;RI;?Ig
in which outside ￿rms observe the expected productivity of the worker GI, the realised
productivity of the worker in their current employment (more strictly, the estimate of
future productivity within the ￿rm), or simply nothing. Most of the related literature
also restricts attention to these policies. Our analysis clari￿es the forces at work and
￿xes some general features of the feasible set. Then, in Section 3.3, we specialise to the
joint normal case. This allows us to explicitly trace through the impact of a rich set of
alternative information structures on labour market outcomes.
3.2 General Distribution, Restricted Information Structures
3.2.1 Information Structures, ￿I = fGI;RI;?Ig
Here we consider the following three more or less natural information structure.
1. GI￿disclosure, outside ￿rms observe ￿rm I￿ s best estimate of the worker￿ s general
human capital: TI(QI) = E[YJIjQI] = GI.12
2. RI￿disclosure, outside ￿rms observe ￿rm I￿ s of the worker￿ s productivity if retained
within the ￿rm TI(QI) = E[YIIjQI] = RI.
3. ?I￿disclosure,13 outside ￿rms observe no additional information: TI(QI) = ?I.
12Note that the same results would be achieved if outside ￿rms observe all of the available information
in the vector QI. Throughout we restrict our attention to outside ￿rms observing scalar information
statistics.
13We retain the subscript since, below, we allow for di⁄erent types of current employer who may be
more or less e⁄ective in transferring general human capital to the worker.
123.2.2 Wages and Pro￿ts
GI￿disclosure
wGI(GI) = E[GIjGI;RI ￿ wG(GI)] = GI: (6)
Notice that there is no adverse selection under general disclosure: ASGI(g) = 0. This is
because, having observed GI = g, outside ￿rms have no reason to pay attention to the
employer￿ s retention behaviour. Taking expectations over the random variable wGI(GI),
the expected employment wage is simply expected general human capital
WG = E[GI]: (7)
RI￿disclosure
wR(RI) = E[GIjRI;RI ￿ wR(RI)] = E[GIjRI]: (8)
Again, there is no adverse selection, ASRI(r) = 0; in this case, because the disclosed
statistic RI = r supplies ￿ner information than the event that the worker is released,
RI ￿ wR(r). However, there is now regression to the mean, with r ￿ E[GIjRI = r]
increasing in r. Intuitively, outside ￿rms anticipate that low (high) values of ￿rm I
retained productivity may be due to a negative (positive) match and that productivity
in a new match will tend to regress to the ex-ante expected value. By the law of iterated
expectations, the expected employment wage is still equal to expected general human
capital
WR = E[(E[GIjRI])] = E[GI]: (9)
?I￿disclosure
w?I = E[GIjRI ￿ w?]: (10)
There is now adverse selection, AS?I > 0: However, in contrast to Akerlof￿ s (1970)
lemons model or Greenwald￿ s (1986) application to the labour market, w?I does not
collapse to the lower support of GI (even in the absence of a minimum wage) because
outside ￿rms anticipate that low values of ￿rm I productivity will partly be redressed
by regression to the mean.
Using the above wage comparisons, we now state two results which compare the
information structures fGI;RI;?Ig.
Proposition 1. For any ￿rm I, GI￿disclosure generates maximum expected surplus:
13Proof. Under GI-disclosure, wGI(GI) = GI and so, from(3), ￿GI = E[(RI ￿ GI)
+]:
Summing ￿GI and WGI gives E[GI] + E[(RI ￿ GI)
+] which is clearly the maximum
achievable expected surplus.
Under GI-disclosure a current employer releases its worker whenever RI ￿ GI:
Since this implies that the worker is released if and only if there is a negative match,
labour is always e¢ ciently allocated across ￿rms. The same cannot be said of the two
other information structures. Under RI-disclosure, ￿rm I releases its worker whenever
RI < E[GIjRI] and so it is possible for the worker to be released following a positive
match (because GI is low) and retained following a negative match (because GI is high).
As we now show, ?I-disclosure is less e¢ cient still.
Proposition 2. For any ￿rm I,
i. RI-disclosure generates WRI = WGI; ￿RI ￿ ￿GI;
ii. ?I-disclosure generates W?I ￿ WGI; ￿?I ￿ ￿GI with
W?I + ￿?I ￿ WRI + ￿RI ￿ WGI + ￿GI:
Proof. The ranking of expected employment wages W?I < WRI = WGI follows
from (7), (9) and (10). The pro￿t ranking ￿RI ￿ ￿GI follows from Proposition 1 and
the fact that WRI = WGI.
To establish ￿?I ￿ ￿GI, note since E[GI] ￿ w?; it is immediate that ￿?I =
E[(RI ￿ w?)
+] ￿ E[(RI ￿ E[GI])
+]: It su¢ ces therefore to establish E[(RI ￿ E[GI])
+]
￿ E[(RI ￿ GI)
+]:
The result follows because the variation in GI tends to cancel the variation in RI
and convex functions ￿ like￿variation. More precisely, note that E[RI ￿E[GI]jRI ￿GI =
x] ￿ E[RI ￿ GIjRI ￿ GI = x] = E[GI ￿ E[GI]jRI ￿ GI = x] is increasing in x by
Assumption 2. This fact, together with the equality of means, implies the random
variable E[RI ￿ E[GI]jRI] is riskier than E[RI ￿ GIjRI]: Using the convexity of (x)+
gives the result.
To establish W?I +￿?I ￿ WRI +￿RI note that under RI￿disclosure, ￿rm I retains
the worker in the event E[RI ￿ GIjRI] ￿ 0: Hence the RI￿disclosure allocation solves




14where p is any probability of retention based on RI: The ?I￿disclosure e¢ ciency level
E[(RI ￿ GI):1fR ￿ w?g] = E[E[RI ￿ GIjRI]:1fRI ￿ w?)]
is smaller by revealed preference.
The set, ￿(fGI;RI;?Ig) of the expected wages and pro￿ts that can be generated
by the disclosure polices GI;RI;?I, as derived in Propositions 1 and 2, is illustrated in
Figure 1, where downward sloping lines depict points of equal expected surplus. When
outside ￿rms observe GI, this generates higher expected surplus for ￿rm I than when
the outside ￿rms observe RI because, as noted above, it results in more e¢ cient reten-
tion behaviour. Bertrand competition between outside ￿rms ensures that this expected
surplus is split between ￿rm I and its worker. Since the expected employment wage is
the same in both cases, ￿rm I must be strictly worse o⁄ under RI-disclosure by virtue
of the ￿smaller pie￿ . Ine¢ cient retention behaviour creates an even ￿smaller pie￿when
outside ￿rms have no information. Intuitively, adverse selection depresses wages and
causes excess recruitment relative to RI-disclosure. A key di⁄erence now is that, al-
though expected surplus is smaller, the worker receives a smaller share. Proposition 2
tells us that adverse selection drives the expected employment wage W?I su¢ ciently far
below WGI to leave ￿rm I better o⁄.
Figure 1: Wages and Pro￿ts for
￿I = fGI;RI;;Ig.
Notice that, under ?I-disclosure the adverse selection that drives down wages is
ameliorated by regression to the mean. Firm I would, therefore, enjoy higher pro￿ts
if the regression to the mean e⁄ect were ￿turned o⁄￿ . In fact, the best information
15structure from Firm I0s perspective would be one which induces severe adverse selection
for any worker it wishes to retain (but not for one the ￿rm wishes to release since this
would avoid up-front transfers when the ￿rm must attract the worker initially). We show
how an information structure along these lines can arise in Section 3.3.2, below, where
we consider information structures that combine RI and GI.
3.3 Joint Normal Distribution, Arbitrary Disclosure Policies
For any ￿rm I, the random variables (GI;RI) are now assumed to be joint normally
distributed. In some of what follows (namely where we calculate wages), we will also
assume that GI and (RI ￿ GI) are independent. To avoid confusion, we will term the
former case ￿ joint normality￿and the latter the ￿ independent joint normal￿model.
3.3.1 Joint normal information structures
We also limit the set ￿I of information structures that we consider, to information
structures such that (GI;RI;TI) are joint normally distributed with TI scalar. This as-
sumption rules out mixed structures (e.g. that outside ￿rms observe GI with probability
p and RI with probability 1￿p), conditional structures (e.g. observe RI if GI ￿ 0) and
partitional strategies (e.g. observe either that GI ￿ 0 or GI < 0). It does, however,
close the model in a natural way.
With (GI;RI;TI) joint normal, a convenient parameterisation is in terms of the
linear combination TI = aGI + bRI + cXI, where XI is a unit variance, independent
noise term available via QI. Since the random variable TI can always be rescaled to have
any chosen mean and variance without altering its information content, only two of the
parameters a, b, and c are free. It is convenient to set a = 1￿b, implying that disclosure
policies are characterised by the two parameters b and c:
TI = (1 ￿ b)GI + bRI + cXI: (11)
The above parameterisation simpli￿es the characterisation of the feasible set. How-
ever, it will also be useful to map from these parameters to their associated regression
coe¢ cients. In what follows, we will use two simple and two multiple regression coe¢ -
cients. The simple coe¢ cients are on TI in the regression of GI (RI) on TI, which we
denote by ￿GITI (￿RITI). Normalising V ar(GI) = 1, denoting V ar(RI ￿ GI) by ￿2, and
16assuming Cov(GI;RI) = 1, these coe¢ cients write as
￿GITI =
1




1 + b2￿2 + c2.
The multiple coe¢ cients are on TI (RI) in the multiple regression of GI on TI and RI;
which we denote by ￿GITI:RI (￿GIRI:TI) and write as
￿GITI:RI =
(1 ￿ b)￿2
(1 + ￿2)(1 + b2￿2 + c2) ￿ (1 + b￿2)2
and
￿GIRI:TI =
(1 + b2￿2 + c2) ￿ (1 + b￿2)
(1 + ￿2)(1 + b2￿2 + c2) ￿ (1 + b￿2)2:
The three information structures discussed in Section 3.2 are easily stated under
either parameterisation. GI-disclosure corresponds to b = c = 0, giving ￿GITI = ￿RITI =
1 = ￿GITI:RI = 1 and ￿GIRI:TI = 0. RI-disclosure corresponds to b = 1, c = 0, giving
￿GITI = 1=(1 + ￿2) and ￿RITI = 1 with the remaining coe¢ cients unde￿ned.14 Fi-
nally, ?I￿disclosure corresponds to c ! 1, giving ￿GITI = ￿RITI = ￿GITI:RI = 0 and
￿GIRI:TI = 1=(1 + ￿2). However, in addition to outside ￿rms observing GI, RI or XI,
our framework information structures that combine these random variables. It is worth
highlighting the following cases:
1. Garbling GI with b = 0;c 6= 0 (￿GITI:RI, ￿GIRI:TI > 0).
2. No garbling: Linear combinations of GI and RI
(a) Weighting (RI ￿ GI), with b > 1;c = 0 (￿GITI:RI < 0; ￿GIRI:TI > 0).
(b) Weighting GI, with 1 > b > 0;c = 0 (￿GITI:RI > 0; ￿GIRI:TI < 0).
(c) Di⁄erencing GI and RI with b < 0;c = 0 (￿GITI:RI; ￿GIRI:TI > 0).
Under each of these cases, ￿rm I￿ s retention behaviour conveys information and so there
is adverse selection for outsiders in recruitment, ASTI(t) 6= 0.
14A singularity occurs at TI = RI:
173.3.2 Wages and Pro￿ts
Our ￿rst result expresses wTI(t) in terms of the regression coe¢ cients, the conditional
standard deviation of the random variable [RIjTI = t], denoted by ￿RIjTI, and the unit
normal hazard function h.15
Proposition 3. Under joint normality, the equilibrium employment wage satis￿es














The employment wage function takes a particularly simple form for garblings of GI, i.e.
disclosures of GI plus noise. In this case, adverse selection is constant and equilibrium
employment wages equal expected outside productivity conditional only on TI less this
constant. To see this note that if TI is such a garbling, since RI ￿ GI is uncorrelated
with GI; it is uncorrelated with the garbling TI; hence ￿(RI￿GI)TI = 0, and therefore






, for all t,
which implicitly de￿nes ASTI(t) as a constant. We can write this constant as
ASTI(0) = ￿RIjTIk(￿GIRI:TI): (14)
where k(x) is the iteration k(x) = xh(xh(:::)), this evidently has a ￿xed point at zero,
the only other is at a point we denote k ￿ 0:302. It follows that
Corollary 1. Under joint normality, for TI any garbling of GI, the equilibrium em-
ployment wage satis￿es
wTI(t) = ￿GITIt ￿ k￿RIjTI ￿ ￿GITIt ￿ 0:3￿RIjTI: (15)
15The conditional standard deviation writes as ￿RIjTI = ((1 + ￿2) ￿
￿
1 ￿ b + (1 + ￿2)b
￿2
)1=2:
18The amount of adverse selection is, unsurprisingly, increasing in ￿RIjTI which is a measure
of how much uncertainty is left to be attributed to the retention decision. As TI garbles
GI more, ￿RIjTI increases.
In general, for information structures other than garblings of GI, of course, adverse
selection is not independent of the realised disclosure. Note, however, that, for any given
information policy, the sign of adverse selection is constant for all realizations of the
information available to outside ￿rms, t (it has the same sign as ￿GIRI:TI). Moreover at
the realisation TI = 0, equation (14) remains valid for any disclosure policy for which
there is ￿nite adverse selection. Hence, at the mean realisation of the disclosed statistics,
realised wages are ranked according to the conditional standard deviations ￿RIjTI.
Proposition 3 solves for the employment wage in terms of a calculable function.
Given this function, retention decisions and the current employer￿ s pro￿ts can also be
calculated for every information structure in ￿I.16 We refer to the upper boundary of the
set of wages and pro￿ts, ￿(￿I), as the e¢ ciency frontier, since on this boundary there
is no information structure that yields the same expected wage for the worker without
reducing the ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿t. Our next result (calculated using (12) with GI and
(RI ￿ GI) assumed independent) shows that the e¢ ciency frontier does not consist of
policies which garble GI with noise, rather GI is combined with RI.
Result 4. In the independent joint normal model, for any ￿rm I, the e¢ ciency frontier
of the set ￿(￿I) is generated by the disclosure policies TI = (1 ￿ b)GI + bRI; with
b < 1; c = 0:
1. With 1 > b > 0; expected employment wages WTI are greater than E[GI]:
2. With b = 0; expected employment wages equal E[GI]:
3. With b < 0; expected employment wages are less than E[GI]:
4. A policy with b = 1;c = 0 is on the lower boundary of the set.
5. A policy with b > 1;c = 0 induces extreme adverse selection, expected employ-
ment wages are in￿nite.
It is worth pausing to discuss features of the set of wage, pro￿t pairs that di⁄erent
information structures can generate and, in particular, its e¢ ciency frontier plotted in
Figure 2 (for values of b 2 [1=3;￿4=3]). We ￿rst consider what is required for an
16All calculations here and for Results 8 and 9, and Figures 2, 3, 5 and 6 are available from the
authors as Mathematica Notebook ￿les.
19information structure to drive the expected employment wage below E[GK], and then
how a given reduction in WTI can be achieved most e¢ ciently.
Figure 2: The E¢ ciency Frontier, plotted for
GI ￿ N[0;1] and RI ￿ N[0;1].
To drive the expected employment wage below E[GI], the expected adverse selec-
tion must be positive. From (13), ASTI(t) is positive only if ￿GIRI:TI > 0; giving a simple
and intuitive condition. Firm I￿ s retention decision will create adverse (rather than pos-
itive) selection￿ i.e. depress wTI(t) = E[GIjTI = t;RI ￿ wTI(t)] below E[GjT = t]￿ if
and only if a lower value of RI is bad news for GI given TI:
One might think that this condition will hold whenever retention behaviour is
informative. As Figure 3 illustrates, this is not the case; there are information structures
that lead to an expected wage for the worker that lies above E[GI], that is there is positive
rather than adverse selection. The unifying feature of these information structures with
￿GIRI:TI < 0 is that GI is combined with RI, with more weight on GI.17 Of course,
as Figure 2 also illustrates, there are many information structures that do satisfy this
condition and hence drive the expected employment wage below E[GK]. Indeed, of the
four types of ￿ combined￿structures listed at the end of Section 3.3.1, above, only the
third (weighting GI) fails in creating adverse selection. The question is therefore why
some of these information structures are more e¢ cient than others, and in particular
why the fourth type (di⁄erencing GI and RI, with b < 0 and c = 0) traces out the
e¢ ciency frontier below E[GI]?
17With no noise (c = 0), any b 2 (0;1) will generate positive selection. With noise, the range of
policies becomes more tightly bounded above 0 and below 1.
20To see the answer, note that, even when two information structures generate the
same expected employment wage, the distribution of adverse selection over t may vary.
Figure 3 illustrates, depicting two information structures that generate the same ex-
pected adverse selection (the area under both quantile functions is ￿ 0:47) but with very
di⁄erent distributions. A garbling of GI (policy C) depresses wages uniformly: ASTI is
constant at every quantile of TI = GI +
p
5=2XI. In contrast, di⁄erencing RI and GI
(policy D) imposes a lot of adverse selection at low quantiles of TI = 3=2GI ￿1=2RI and
little adverse selection at high quantiles (and indeed none at p = 1). This is e¢ cient, as
low quantiles are associated with good matches, while high quantiles are associated with
bad matches. Since this information structure depresses wages most when retention is
e¢ cient and least when retention is ine¢ cient, it generates a higher surplus than the
information structure where wages are depressed uniformly (in Figure 2 the wage-pro￿t
pair associated with policy C lies to the left of the pair associated with policy D).
Figure 3: Adverse Selection of Quantiles of TI plotted
for GI ￿ N[0;1] and RI ￿ N[0;2].
The above logic explains why garbling GI, the ￿rst type of information structure,
is less e¢ cient than di⁄erencing GI and RI, the fourth, and indeed why a garbling of
a di⁄erenced estimate of inside and outside productivity (b < 0;c 6= 0) lies inside the
e¢ ciency frontier. All that remains is to consider the second type of policy (weighting
RI ￿ GI with b > 1;c = 0). The reason why this type of policy fails to trace out the
e¢ ciency frontier is simple. By weighting the disclosure statistic towards RI￿GI, that is
match quality, the information structure eliminates regression to the mean. This leaves
adverse selection to hit with full force, depressing wages not simply below E[GI] but as
far as the lower support.
21This logic also highlights the strength of certain information structures outside the
set of joint normally distributed information that we are considering here. In particular,
a policy which discloses GI whenever RI ￿ GI < 0 and discloses RI otherwise, induces
no allocative ine¢ ciency￿ those workers expected to be more productive at other ￿rms
are released￿ but induces full adverse selection, driving the second period wage as far as
the lower support of GI on those workers who are e¢ ciently retained.
Having discussed how di⁄erent information structures a⁄ect expected wages and
pro￿ts, we now extend the model, endogenizing the information structures associated
with di⁄erent ￿rms and tracing out implication for labour market outcomes.
4 A Two period model of labour market competition
In this section, we extend the basic model presented above. We suppose that there are
two periods of employment. In the ￿rst period all potential employers hold the same
information about potential employees. Employees are attracted to ￿rms, not only by the
wages o⁄ered, but also by the career prospects that a ￿rm o⁄ers. These career prospects
arise from (exogenous) variation in the extent to which ￿rst period employment at a
￿rm augments an employee￿ s general human capital, and endogenous variation through
a ￿rm￿ s strategic choice of an information disclosure policy, which a⁄ects the information
available to rival employers competing for the worker in the second period of employment.
Speci￿cally, we consider an economy that consists of N ￿rms (each with a single
position available) and M < N workers. Firms compete to hire, or retain, a worker in
periods one and two. The ￿rst period employer, ￿rm I, is the inside ￿rm in the second
period, and wages in the second period are determined as in Section 2. It is a convenient
simpli￿cation to refer to ￿rst period employment as training and to suppose that the
employee is not productive in the ￿rst period, but gains skills that depend on the identity
of the ￿rst period employer.
We take the view that certain ￿rms, typically innovative or in some other way
privileged, naturally enable workers to acquire more skills. As such, we do not assume
that E[GI] = E[GI0] for all I;I0. Rather, we make the next simplest assumption which
is to distinguish between ￿skill-augmenting￿and ￿competitive￿￿rms. When we wish to
invoke this distinction we will refer to a typical skill-augmenting ￿rm as ￿rm K and a
typical competitive ￿rm as ￿rm J (I continues to denote a generic ￿rm).
Assumption 3. There are N1 < M skill-augmenting ￿rms and N ￿ N1 competitive
￿rms in the economy. Competitive ￿rms are exchangeable: for each pair of com-
22petitive ￿rms J;J0; (QJ;YJI) is equal in distribution to (QJ0;YJ0I): For each skill-
augmenting ￿rm K; (GK;RK) has the same distributions as (GJ +￿K;RJ +￿K)
for some ￿K > 0: In other words skill-augmenting ￿rms, simply add ￿K to the
general human capital of their employees.
Just as Assumption 1 simpli￿es second period labour market competition, As-
sumption 3 simpli￿es ￿rst period labour market competition. Skill-augmenting ￿rms are
advantaged and in short-supply, and will (therefore) all hire one worker at the prevailing
wage. This leaves the remaining N ￿ N1 exchangeable ￿rms to Bertrand compete for
the M ￿N1 free workers. It is this Bertrand competition that determines the prevailing
wage. Our concern will be to explore how the employment policies of di⁄erent ￿rms vary
with the size of the skill gap. We remark that the skill gap is treated here as exogenous
but in a natural variant of the model it could arise from ￿rms choosing to invest in
general human capital, as brie￿ y discussed in Section 6.
When discussing labour market outcomes, it will be of interest to consider a vari-
ant of Assumption 3 in which N1 is a variable parameter which may exceed the num-
ber of workers M. In this event (corresponding to a high demand for labour in the
skill-augmenting sector), the employment wage will be set by skill-augmenting ￿rms
themselves.
Assumption 30. There are N1 exchangeable skill-augmenting ￿rms and N ￿ N1 ex-
changeable competitive ￿rms in the economy. For each skill-augmenting ￿rm K;
the skill gap ￿ = E[GK] ￿ E[GJ] is positive.
Assumption 30 di⁄ers from Assumption 3 in that all the skill-augmenting ￿rms are iden-
tical. This will serve to make wage setting Bertrand-competitive in the case where
N1 > M.
First Period Contracts It remains to describe, ￿rst period competition: The N ￿rms
compete to hire a worker in the ￿rst period through publicly observable contracts. For
a given ￿rm I, a contract speci￿es:
1. A training wage wI ￿ 0. The worker is credit constrained.
2. A disclosure policy TI = TI(QI) from a set of possible disclosure policies (or infor-
mation structures) ￿I. Equivalently, having characterized the set of feasible second
period wage, pro￿t pairs that can be generated given the set of disclosure ￿I, it is
convenient to think of the ￿rm as choosing such a pair (WTI;￿TI) from the feasible
set ￿(￿I).
23Note that we assume ￿rms cannot disclose what they do not know and we do not
allow ￿rms to manipulate the statistics that they disclose. We believe these not only to
be useful assumptions for tractability, but plausible ones when we interpret the informa-
tion disclosed to outside ￿rms as arising from choices about organizational design and
the organization of production (for example, on the extent and composition of team-
work rather than solo production, the extent of hierarchy and the level of individual
discretion).18 Moreover, reputation concerns (and the desire to hire other workers in the
future) might also allow ￿rms to make credible commitments about more direct disclo-
sure policies (such as consulting ￿rms choosing whether or not to cite juniors involvement
in ￿nal reports, or decisions to give them more or less access to clients). Note that while
many of these examples concern discrete rather than continuous scalar disclosure statis-
tics, similar economic forces should be present, and our assumptions on distributions as
well as the disclosed statistic are analytically convenient.
5 Analysis
Our simplifying assumptions enable us to characterise equilibria piecemeal by solving
two maximisation problems, one for a representative competitive ￿rm J and another for
a skill-augmenting ￿rm K. Note, that for a given disclosure policy TI, the second period
is identical to the model described in Section 2. In particular, the expected second period
wage is given by (2) and expected second period pro￿t by (3).
Workers in assessing ￿rst period contracts take into account both the wage o⁄ered
and, also, the expected second period wage. This, in turn, depends on the identity
of the ￿rm (and the extent of general human capital that she anticipates acquiring in
the training period) and the disclosure policy to which the ￿rm commits through the
contract.
Competitive ￿rms attempt to hire one of the M ￿ N1 ￿ free￿workers in the ￿rst
period. Since they face ￿erce competition, they attract workers by transferring as much
surplus as possible to the worker (up to the zero pro￿t constraint). They transfer surplus
most easily through a higher ￿rst period wage. Speci￿cally, by o⁄ering to pay their entire
expected second period pro￿t in training wages: wJ = ￿TJ. Thus, the problem facing a
competitive ￿rm J when choosing a disclosure policy is simply one of expected surplus
18Note that such choices over organization designs are likely to involve productive costs. We abstract





WTJ + ￿TJ. (16)
Following, Proposition 1, this is maximized by choosing GJ-disclosure when this disclo-
sure policy is available.
This behaviour by competitive ￿rms pins down a worker￿ s outside-option. Any
worker turning down a training contract at a skill-augmenting ￿rm can receive WTJ +￿TJ
at a competitive ￿rm. Denoting this equilibrium outside-option by ￿ U, the problem facing
a skill-augmenting ￿rm K (or indeed any other) can be written as
max
(WTK;￿TK)2￿(￿K)
WTK + ￿TK ￿ ￿ U + (￿ U ￿ WTK)
￿; (17)
where (x)￿ denotes x when negative, zero otherwise. Notice that when ￿ U > WTK, the
maximand in (17) di⁄ers from that in (16) only by a constant, and when ￿ U ￿ WTK it
coincides with (3); the ￿rm chooses the training wage and disclosure policy to maximize
its second period pro￿ts.
Overall, we de￿ne an equilibrium as an array of training contracts for competi-
tive ￿rms fwJ;TJgJ each satisfying surplus maximisation (16), and an array of training
contracts for skill-augmenting ￿rms fwK;TKgK each satisfying (worker participation
constrained) pro￿t maximisation (17). The maximisation problems are entirely straight-
forward, given our characterization of the feasible set ￿(￿I).
5.1 Equilibrium Contracts and Labour Market Outcomes: Gen-
eral Results
Here, we can use the characterization of second period wages and pro￿ts from Section
3.2.2. In addition to using these to characterise contracts (which are typically hard
to observe), we are also interested in their consequences for observable labour market
outcomes. The following all depend heavily on the disclosure policy and are therefore
characterised alongside equilibrium contracts for di⁄erent ￿rms J;K:
1. Probability of labour turnover;
2. Unconditional wage distribution for workers;
3. Conditional wage distributions for retained and released workers.
The following result holds regardless of ￿J (providing GJ-disclosure is in this set).
25Proposition 5. For each competitive ￿rm J with GJ 2 ￿J;
i. Contracts: The o⁄ered contracts feature GJ-disclosure and a training wage of wJ =
￿GJ.
ii. Labour market outcomes: Labour turnover takes place with probability Pr[RJ < GJ]:
The distribution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of GJ: If
GJ and (RJ ￿ GJ) are independent, the distribution of wages is the same for both
retained and released workers; if GJ and (RJ ￿ GJ) are a¢ liated the distribution
of wages for retained workers ￿rst degree stochastically dominates that for released
workers.
Proof. A competitive ￿rm J chooses GJ-disclosure since this maximises expected
surplus. Bertrand competition (zero pro￿ts) ensures that wJ = ￿GJ = E[(RJ ￿ GJ)+].
The labour market outcomes follow immediately from the choice of disclosure policy.
Proposition 5 is intuitive, the more striking results will appear when we contrast
with the situation of skill-augmenting ￿rms.
Behaviour by competitive ￿rms pins down ￿ U = E[GJ]+E[(RJ￿GJ)+]: This obser-
vation, together with Proposition 2, enables us to solve the maximisation problem in (17),
and hence characterise the equilibrium behaviour of, and resulting labour market out-
comes for, skill-augmenting ￿rms with available disclosure policies ￿K = fGK;RK;?Kg.
Proposition 6. For a skill-augmenting ￿rm K with ￿K = fGK;RK;?Kg;
1. If E[GK] is small (E[GK] ￿ E[GJ] + E[(RJ ￿ GJ)+] su¢ ces); then
i. Contracts: GK-disclosure and a training wage of wK = maxf￿ U ￿ E[GK];0g:
ii. Labour market outcomes: Labour turnover takes place with probability Pr[(RK ￿ GK) <
0]: The distribution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of GK and,
if GK and (RK ￿ GK) are independent, is the same for both retained and released
workers.
2. If E[GK] is su¢ ciently large, (E[GK] > E[GJ] + E[jRJ ￿ GJj] su¢ ces); then
i. Contracts: ?K-disclosure and a training wage of wK = maxf￿ U ￿ W?K;0g:
ii. Labour market outcomes: Labour turnover takes place with positive probability (less
than
Pr[(RK ￿ GK) < 0]): The distribution of employment wages is degenerate at W?K <
E[GK] for both retained and released workers.
26Proof. If E[GK] ￿ ￿ U, then GK￿disclosure maximises surplus and the training
wage wK = ￿ U ￿ E[GK] just meets the worker participation constraint. Therefore this
policy maximises ￿rm K expected pro￿t subject to the worker participation constraint.
If E[GK] > ￿ U, then GK￿disclosure with training wages wK = 0 remains e¢ cient but
the worker receives some of the surplus in excess of the participation constraint. In a
neighbourhood where E[GK] ￿ ￿ U is positive but small, the surplus paid to the worker
remains less than the e¢ ciency loss of switching to another disclosure policy.
If E[GK]￿￿ U is positive and large enough, the extra surplus paid to the worker under
GK￿disclosure will exceed the e¢ ciency loss under null disclosure. To verify this consider
the two cases (a) w?K ￿ ￿ U; (b) w?K < ￿ U: For case (a) Proposition 2(ii) establishes that
pro￿t is higher under null disclosure, training wages are set at zero. In case (b) ￿rm
pro￿t is E[(RK ￿w?K)+]￿(￿ U ￿w?K) ￿ E[RK ￿w?K]￿ ￿ U +w?K = E[RK]￿ ￿ U: Hence,
it su¢ ces that E[RK]￿ ￿ U ￿ E[(RK ￿GK)+]: Equivalently, E[RK ￿GK]+E[GK]￿ ￿ U ￿
E[(RK ￿ GK)+], or E[GK] ￿ ￿ U ￿ ￿E[(RK ￿ GK)￿] = E[(GK ￿ RK)+]: Substituting
for ￿ U; E[GK] ￿ E[GJ] + E[(RJ ￿ GJ)+] + E[(RK ￿ GK)+]: The result follows since, by
Assumption 3, RJ ￿ GJ and RK ￿ GK have the same (symmetric) distributions.
Figure 4 displays the situation. Suppose the worker￿ s outside-option is at the level
of point A (above WGK). In this case, even the high expected employment wage under
GK-disclosure, fails to (strictly) satisfy the worker￿ s participation constraint. To hire the
worker, a skill-augmenting ￿rm K must surrender expected pro￿t by paying a positive
training wage. It will adopt a policy of GK-disclosure, since this maximises the ￿pie￿
and, with the worker￿ s share ￿xed, leaves the largest possible share for the ￿rm.
Figure 4: Disclosure Policies given Reservation
Utility Constraints.
27Alternatively, suppose the worker￿ s outside-option is at the level of point B (below
but in the neighbourhood of WGK). In this case, the expected employment wage under
GK-disclosure more than meets the worker￿ s outside-option. The ideal strategy for ￿rm
K would be to o⁄er a negative training wage that held the worker to her outside-option
and increased expected pro￿t by WGK ￿ ￿ U. However, given worker credit constraints,
this is not possible. With the ￿rm unable to claw back rent via the training wage,
switching to a disclosure policy that generates adverse selection starts to look attractive.
Unfortunately for the ￿rm, switching to ?K￿disclosure destroys surplus. Once it has
compensated the worker for the shortfall in utility (￿ U ￿ W?K) by paying a positive
training wage, the remaining level of expected pro￿t is less than that achievable under
GK-disclosure; i.e. in Figure 2, point B lies to the left of ￿GK. In contrast, suppose the
worker￿ s outside option is at the level of point C (some distance below WGK). Now the
￿rm will choose ?K-disclosure. In this case the rent to be recouped is large enough to
justify the destruction of surplus; i.e. point C lies to the right of ￿GK.
Proposition 6 takes a restricted set of polices for comparison. This, it shares with
most of the disclosure literature. The implications for labour market outcomes are rather
stark, especially in that the distribution of wages for workers in the K ￿rms becomes
degenerate. We now allow for a wider class of disclosure policies, again, by specialising
to a joint normal distribution.
5.2 Equilibrium Contracts under joint normality
We return to the framework of Section 3.3 and suppose that the ￿rm can choose any
disclosure policy of the form (11).19 We start by stating that ￿rms never adopt disclo-
sure policies which induce a negative conditional correlation between estimates of inside
productivity and outside productivity. Intuitively, this makes sense since if such a nega-
tive correlation were present, then the event that a worker is not retained becomes ￿ good
news￿regarding the outside productivity of the worker. This is the opposite of a winners￿
curse and the positive rather than adverse selection e⁄ect would serve to drive up the
wage o⁄ers of competing employers, making it more expensive to retain workers. This,
in e⁄ect, transfers surplus from the ￿rm to the worker; however, the ￿rm can transfer
surplus directly through ￿rst period wages, rather than through a disclosure policy that
destroys overall surplus by misallocating the worker.
19As various seminar participants have pointed out, this class of policies may be broader than might
be feasibly implemented through organization design. In this case, the analysis here can be viewed as
highlighting economic mechanisms and suggesting forces at work when ￿rms choose from restricted and
(perhaps discrete) disclosure policies.
28Proposition 7. Under joint normality, neither competitive nor skill-augmenting ￿rms
ever choose a disclosure policy with ￿GIRI:TI < 0:
Proof. The fact that each competitive ￿rm J chooses GJ-disclosure follows from
Proposition 1. Suppose the skill-augmenting ￿rm chooses ￿GKRK:TK < 0. Then expected
second period pro￿t is
E[(RK ￿ wTK(TK))
+] = E[(RK ￿ E[GKjTK] ￿ ASTK(TK))
+]
￿ E[(RK ￿ E[GKjTK])
+] ￿ E[E[(RK ￿ GK)
+jTK]] = E[(RK ￿ GK)
+];
where the ￿rst inequality follows from ASTK(TK) ￿ 0 and the second follows from ap-
plication of Jensen￿ s inequality. A disclosure policy with ￿GKRK:TK < 0 therefore leads
to lower expected second period pro￿t than general disclosure.
Finally, we can use our characterization of the feasible set of wage, pro￿t pairs
from Result 4, to characterize the disclosure policies chosen by skill-augmenting ￿rms is
described as follows, where ￿ U = E[GJ] + E[(RJ ￿ GJ)+].
Result 8. In the independent joint normal model, for a skill-augmenting ￿rm K,
1. If E[GK] is small (E[GK] ￿ ￿ U su¢ ces), then contracts are GK-disclosure and a
training wage of wK = maxf￿ U ￿ E[GK];0g:
2. If E[GK] is large (E[GK] > ￿ U su¢ ces), then contracts are a disclosure policy TK =
(1 ￿ b)GK + bRK; with b decreasing in E[GK]; and a training wage of wK = 0.
This result follows directly from the calculation of the e¢ ciency frontier. It is
helpful to compare the equilibrium contracts chosen by a skill-augmenting ￿rm when
￿K is joint normal with the case discussed in Section 5.1 where ￿K = fGK;RK;?Kg:
The ￿rst part of the result is simply a restatement of the ￿rst part of Proposition 6: if
the general skills acquired at ￿rm K are expected to be low, then ￿rm K chooses GK-
disclosure to meet the worker￿ s reservation utility in the most e¢ cient manner possible.
However, if ￿rm K is advantaged, so that the general skills acquired at ￿rm K are
expected to exceed the worker￿ s reservation utility (as pinned down by the competitive
fringe), then the ￿rm will switch to a policy that generates adverse selection. Of course,
it is in the ￿rm￿ s interest to depress wages as e¢ ciently as possible and so the disclosure
policy will be a (noiseless) di⁄erence of inside and outside productivity. As the size of
the skill gap increases, ￿rm K claws back rent from the worker by increasing expected
adverse selection (decreasing b further below zero thereby increasing ￿GKRK:TK).
295.2.1 Comparative Statics of Labour Market Outcomes
This section traces the map from technological di⁄erences, via human capital manage-
ment policies through information management to labour market outcomes at the level
of the ￿rm.
With V ar(GK) normalised to 1, the technological position of a skill-augmenting
￿rm K is characterised by three parameters: expected general human capital formation
E[GK]; expected match quality E[RK￿GK] and the variance of match quality V ar(RK￿
GK). The following result describes how changes in these parameters impact on labour
market outcomes in the skill-augmenting sector (holding the technological position of
the competitive sector ￿xed).
Result 9. In the independent joint normal model,
1. If E[GK] is small (E[GK] ￿ ￿ U su¢ ces),
i. the probability of labour turnover is independent of E[GK] and V ar(RK ￿ GK) and
is decreasing in E[RK ￿ GK];
ii. the distribution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of GK:
2. If E[GK] is large (E[GK] > ￿ U su¢ ces)
i. the probability of labour turnover is increasing in V ar(RK ￿ GK) and decreasing in
E[GK] and E[RK ￿ GK];
ii. the distribution of employment wages has mean ￿ U but is no longer normal, with
inequality decreasing in V ar(RK￿GK) and increasing in E[GK] and E[RK￿GK]:
Note that the model and this result assume that each ￿rm has a single worker,
but they are suggestive on the relationship between wage dispersion and performance at
the ￿rm level. Speci￿cally, skill-augmenting ￿rms are able to earn pro￿ts through their
rare ability to augment human-capital and so should be observed as more pro￿table.
This pro￿tability arises since they are able to extract some rents from workers, ￿rst by
driving down training wages leading to greater wage inequality between ￿rst- and second-
period workers, but also through choosing innovative disclosure policies that compress
second-period employment wages, suggesting reduced second-period wage dispersion.20
20Empirically, however ￿￿rst￿and ￿second￿periods have not been distinguished, which may account
for mixed empirical results (See, for example, Martins (2008) and Lallemand, Plasman, and Rycx (2007)
and the summary of the literature therein). Typically, the literature has posited that wage dispersion
30Result 9 is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6 (plotted for E[GJ] = E[RJ ￿ GJ] = 0;
V ar(GJ) = V ar(RJ ￿ GJ) = 1, implying ￿ U = E[(RJ ￿ GJ)+] = 1=
p
2￿). We start by
discussing the consequences of technological changes in the skill-augmenting sector for
labour turnover.
Our analysis of the general model established that, for values of E[GK] ￿ ￿ U, labour
turnover occurs with probability Pr[RK < GK] and is therefore independent of E[GK]
by Assumption 3. Figure 5 Panel a plots the case where match quality is distributed
symmetrically around zero, giving rise to a turnover rate of 50% (the top line). Consider a
technological change that increases E[GK] above ￿ U: A skill-augmenting ￿rm will respond
by adjusting its disclosure policy (decreasing b) to claw back the associated rent from
its worker. The adverse selection associated with this change in organisational design
depresses labour turnover.
As one might expect, labour turnover also decreases with a change in technology
that ￿ improves matching￿(E[RK ￿ GK]). Here, however, endogenous organisational
design dampens the e⁄ect. Figure 5 Panel b illustrates by plotting the turnover rate
against E[RK ￿GK]; holding E[GK] = V ar(RK ￿GK) = 1. If E[GK] ￿ ￿ U the turnover
rate is equal to Pr[(RK ￿ GK) < 0] which is evidently decreasing in E[RK ￿ GK]:
With E[GK] > ￿ U, however, ￿rm K will seek to impose adverse selection. Suppose that
E[RK￿GK] declines below 1 but that ￿rm K (sub-optimally) leaves its disclosure policy
￿xed at b ￿ ￿0:37. Labour turnover increases but at a slower rate than Pr[(RK ￿GK) <
0] (compare the middle and the highest line in the Figure). In other words, adverse
selection mutes the e⁄ect of a decline in E[RK￿GK] on labour turnover. This dampening
e⁄ect becomes stronger if ￿rm K adjusts its disclosure policy to keep its worker at ￿ U (the
bottom line in the Figure). As E[RK ￿GK] declines, regression to the mean ameliorates
adverse selection. Larger deviations (more negative b) from GK￿disclosure are therefore
necessary to generate su¢ cient adverse selection and these adjustments depress labour
turnover further below Pr[(RK ￿ GK) < 0].
may explain ￿rm performance and focuses on worker e⁄ort, in particular, contrasting the incentives and
wage dispersion that arise in tournaments (as in Lazear and Rosen, 1981) with the collaboration that
arises from fairness and low wage dispersion (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990 and Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or
the incentives for in￿ uence activities and rent-seeking that may be prevalent with high wage-dispersion
(Milgrom, 1988 and Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) or sabotage in tournaments (Lazear, 1989). Our
results, suggest that ￿rm performance and the extent of wage-dispersion may both arise from the extent
to which a ￿rm has an advantage over its rivals in augmenting general human capital (or providing a
platform for a successful career).
31Figure 5: The Probability of Labour Turnover.
32Figure 5 Panel c illustrates the impact of V ar(RK ￿ GK); holding E[GK] = 1;
E[RK ￿GK] = 0: Again, with E[GK] > ￿ U, ￿rm K will seek to impose adverse selection.
Suppose that V ar(RK ￿GK) declines below 1 but that ￿rm K (sub-optimally) leaves its
disclosure policy ￿xed at b ￿ ￿0:64: Labour turnover decreases further below Pr[(RK ￿
GK) < 0] (compare the bottom and highest line in the Figure). This e⁄ect is muted,
however, if ￿rm K adjusts its disclosure policy to keep its worker at ￿ U (the middle line
in the Figure): Since poorer information about match quality reduces the regression to
the mean e⁄ect, adverse selection hits harder. Smaller deviations (less negative b) from
GK￿disclosure are necessary to generate su¢ cient adverse selection and this depresses
labour turnover less below Pr[(RK ￿ GK) < 0].
Turning to the distribution of employment wages at ￿rm K: for values of E[GK] ￿
￿ U, the distribution of employment wages is identical to the distribution of GK. Given our
assumption that GK and (RK ￿GK) are independent, the distributions for retained and
released workers are identical. For higher values of E[GK]; ￿rm K adjusts its disclosure
policy to keep the expected employment wage equal to ￿ U: Since adverse selection is
greater at lower quantiles of TK (recall Figure 3), the distribution of employment wages
is no longer normal, but becomes negatively skewed.
Figure 6 Panel a illustrates. With E[GK] = 1=
p
2￿, ￿rm K chooses GK￿disclosure
and so the distribution of employment wages following training at ￿rm K simply re￿ ects
the distribution of general human capital (i.e. N[1=
p
2￿;1]). If E[GK] = 2 but ￿rm
K chooses GK￿disclosure, then the distribution of employment wages is translated to
N[2;1]. Of course, it is optimal for the ￿rm to alter its disclosure policy, in this case to
b ￿ ￿2. This adjustment drives the mean employment wage back down to ￿ U and, with
adverse selection hitting hardest on the low TK quantiles, skews the distribution to the
left.
The remaining panels in Figure 6 hold expected general human capital formation
￿xed and vary the distribution of match quality (RK ￿ GK). Suppose that E[GK] =
V ar(RK ￿ GK) = E[RK ￿ GK] = 1 and that ￿rm K chooses a disclosure policy with
b ￿ ￿0:37. If E[RK ￿ GK] declines, so that the expected retained human capital is
lower, but ￿rm K (sub-optimally) leaves its disclosure policy ￿xed then there is less ad-
verse selection. As Panel b illustrates, this change in adverse selection both compresses,
and increases the mean of, the distribution of employment wages. Since the expected
employment wage now exceeds the worker￿ s reservation utility, it is optimal for the ￿rm
to alter its disclosure policy, here to b ￿ ￿1:51. This adjustment reintroduces adverse
selection and skews the distribution of employment wages to the left.
33Figure 6: The Distribution of Employment Wages.
34Finally, consider the impact of a change in V ar(RK ￿GK): Suppose that E[GK] =
V ar(RK ￿ GK) = 1, E[RK ￿ GK] = 0 and that ￿rm K chooses its optimal disclosure
policy with b ￿ ￿0:64: If V ar(RK ￿ GK) declines but ￿rm K (sub-optimally) leaves its
disclosure policy ￿xed there is more adverse selection. As Panel c illustrates, this change
in adverse selection disperses, and decreases the mean of, the distribution of employment
wages. Since the expected wage is below ￿ U, it is optimal for the ￿rm to alter its disclosure
policy, now to b ￿ ￿0:30. This adjustment removes adverse selection, reducing the left
skewness of distribution of employment wages. Indeed, as Panel c makes clear, the overall
e⁄ect of a decrease in the variance of RK ￿ GK resembles a mean-preserving spread in
wages.
Note that one can interpret an increase in the variance of an estimate as an im-
provement in information. This follows since conditioning on extra information produces
a mean preserving spread of conditional expectations: E[YKK ￿YKJjQK;Q0
K] is a mean
preserving spread of E[YKK ￿YKJjQK]. An increase in V ar(RK ￿GK) therefore follows
from technological changes that give ￿rm K a better idea of worker match quality. Im-
provements in information about match quality therefore compress wage distributions.
This contrasts with improvements in information about general human capital (when
￿rms are competitive).
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has made two related contributions. First, we have introduced a model where
workers may vary in both their general ability and their match with particular ￿rms.
In this context, we considered the implications of di⁄erent information structures on
wages and pro￿ts, highlighting that information structures have implications not only
for the distribution of surplus between an employer and worker, but, also, for the aggre-
gate surplus through the possibility of misallocation. Second, we characterised optimal
information management policies. These policies are determined according to whether
the employer is constrained principally by the need to attract workers (participation
constraints) or by an inability to fully leverage acquired general human capital talent
(credit constraints). As has been recognised since Akerlof (1970), the distribution of
information can have striking, apparently disproportionate, e⁄ects on market outcomes.
Our analysis has also highlighted that, where organisational responses to technological
change impact through information ￿ ows, the consequences for wages and turnover rates
may appear to be disproportionately large.
There are several natural extensions that might be considered beyond generalizing
35the results to other wage determination protocols, other types of disclosure policy, or
di⁄erent distributional assumptions. In particular, we brie￿ y discuss broadening the
strategic decisions available to employers to include additional decisions on training and
information acquisition.
First, it is natural to endogenize the extent to which a ￿rm augments human
capital in the training period. If a ￿rm can commit to provide a level of training which
would supplement a worker￿ s natural ability then in the initial period of competition,
￿rms would compete by o⁄ering wages, and committing to both a disclosure policy and
training. As long as training is e¢ cient (that is, as long as the second period productivity
it generates is greater than the ￿rst period cost) then the most cost-e⁄ective means to
attract workers is by providing more training. At some point, however, this might
involve worker paying for these general skills up-front, as proposed by Becker (1964). Of
course, this is impractical when the sums involved are signi￿cant, especially for credit
constrained workers at the outset of their careers. Nevertheless, in the manner described
in Section 5, the worker can e⁄ectively pledge expected second period wages by agreeing
to a contract with an information disclosure policy that leads to higher expected second
period wages.
In contrast to our results above, even when all ￿rms are identical, they may choose
to restrict the information that is released when allowing for a training decision. Again,
competition among ￿rms suggest that ￿rms seek to create as much surplus as possible
and transfer it to workers in order to attract them. However, in Section 5, the only
lever that a ￿rm possesses to generate more surplus is to release information that allows
for the worker to be e¢ ciently allocated in the second period. When the ￿rms have a
training decision, training is potentially another lever with which to create surplus. If
the e¢ cient level of training is such that it would drive the worker￿ s training wage to
the point where the worker￿ s ￿rst period credit constraint binds, then there is a trade-
o⁄ between providing more e¢ cient training and transferring surplus to the ￿rm to
compensate for this training which might require the worker agreeing to an (ine¢ cient)
information disclosure policy that allows the ￿rm to earn some additional second period
rents.21 Equivalently, Becker (1964) has argued that workers must pay for general human
capital and credit constraints might therefore lead to underprovision; here we argue that
agreeing to an information disclosure policy might be a second-best means of allowing
21Note that this paragraph highlights training for general human capital. Since disclosure policies
that allow the ￿rm to earn higher second period rents might also lead to retention levels which are,
from the ex-post perspective when match realizations are realized, ine¢ ciently high, they might also
lead ￿rms to provide more speci￿c training. Empirically, therefore, one might observe ￿complentarities￿
between general and speci￿c training, even though there is no technological link between them.
36the worker to pay for training.
This discussion complements a literature on information frictions and training (for
example Katz and Ziderman (1990), or Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) for an overview)
which has typically, assumed that ￿rms cannot commit to training policies, instead
treating information frictions as exogenous. In these papers, exogenous information
frictions allow the current employer to capture some return for general training and so
lead to training provision. Here instead, we posit the reverse causality: training (when
the worker is credit constrained and cannot pay for it) leads to worker to agree to
information policies that allow the ￿rm to earn a return on its training investment.22
Finally, we have, of course, taken a somewhat narrow view of organisational design,
even given our exclusive focus on information management. In particular, we have ab-
stracted from endogenous information acquisition; for example, through ￿rms￿decisions
on the extent, nature and frequency of appraisal.23 For the purposes of inducing adverse
selection, acquiring more information with a ￿xed amount disclosed is akin to disclosing
less with a ￿xed amount acquired. In other words, ￿rms can manage information simply
by getting to know their workers better. Skill augmenting and competitive ￿rms will
generally take a very di⁄erent view. For competitive ￿rms, information privately ac-
quired about their worker￿ s general human capital becomes a hot potato￿ something to
be passed on to the market as quickly as possible. In contrast, for skill-augmenting ￿rms,
incentives to acquire private information about worker productivity are more nuanced
and one would expect to see deliberate policies designed to generate such information.
These di⁄erential incentives are likely to accentuate the increased wage inequality for
skill-augmenting ￿rms identi￿ed in the paper.
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40Appendix
Proof of statement in Assumption 2. The statement is: E[GIjRI = r],
r ￿ E[GIjRI = r] and E[GIjRI ￿ GI = r] are all increasing in r and, for any w 2 R;
E[GIjRI ￿ w] ￿ E[GI] and E[GIjRI ￿ w] ￿ E[GI]. Let SI = RI ￿ GI and denote the
density of (SI;GI) as f(s;g): The density of (RI;GI) is therefore f(r ￿ g;g) it follows
that from a¢ liation and log concavity that both f(s;g) and f(g;r￿g) are TP2, i.e. both
(SI;GI) and (RI;GI) are a¢ liated. This implies E[GIjRI = r] and E[RI ￿ GIjRI = r]
are increasing in r as required. Also, for all w, E[GIjRI ￿ w] ￿ E[GI].
Proof of Proposition 3. By the law of iterated expectations
wTI(t) = E [GIjTI = t;RI ￿ wTI(t)] = E [E [GIjTI = t;RI]jTI = t;RI ￿ wTI(t)]:
Using the regression equation
E [GIjTI = t;RI] ￿ ￿G = ￿GT:R (t ￿ ￿T) + ￿GR:TRI
and ￿T = 0; we have
wTI(t) = E [￿G + ￿GT:Rt + ￿GR:TRIjTI = t;RI ￿ wTI(t)]
= ￿G + ￿GT:Rt + ￿GR:TE [RIjTI = t;RI ￿ wTI(t)]:






we can write [RIjTI = t] in terms of a standard normal random variable Z:
[RIjTI = t] ￿ E[RIjTI = t] + ￿RjTZ.
Using Z,
wTI(t) = ￿G + ￿GT:Rt + ￿GR:TE [RIjTI = t;RI ￿ wTI(t)]
= ￿G + ￿GT:Rt + ￿GR:TE[RIjTI = t] + ￿GR:T￿RjTE[ZjZ ￿
wTI(t) ￿ E[RIjTI = t]
￿RjT
].
Using the regression equation E [RIjTI = t] ￿ ￿R = ￿RT (t ￿ ￿T) and ￿R = 0, we have
wTI(t) = ￿G + t(￿GT:R + ￿GR:T￿RT) + ￿GR:T￿RjTE[ZjZ ￿
wTI(t) ￿ E[RIjTI = t]
￿RjT
]
41or using Cochrane￿ s identity ￿GT = ￿GT:R + ￿GR:T￿RT,
wTI(t) = E[GIjTI = t] + ￿GR:T￿RjTE[ZjZ ￿
wTI(t) ￿ E[RIjTI = t]
￿RjT
]:
















= ￿E[ZjZ ￿ z]
gives the required expression for wTI(t).
42